The Specific Event
Helen Toner, the Georgetown University researcher who was on the OpenAI board during the brief firing of Sam Altman in November 2023, has given a new interview arguing that we still cannot trust AI CEOs. Her position is not rhetorical. Toner was a sitting board member during the most significant corporate governance crisis in AI history, and her continued skepticism after the fact carries institutional weight that most commentary on AI leadership does not. She is not arguing that Altman or any specific executive is untrustworthy. She is making a structural claim: the incentive architectures surrounding AI leadership make trust, in the classical principal-agent sense, unreliable as a governance mechanism.
Why This Is a Principal-Agent Problem, Not a Character Problem
Toner's argument maps directly onto a well-established problem in organizational theory. Principal-agent theory holds that governance breaks down when the agent (here, the AI CEO) has access to information the principal (the board, regulators, the public) cannot verify, and when the agent's incentives diverge from the principal's interests. What makes the AI context structurally distinct is that both conditions are aggravated simultaneously. The technical complexity of AI development creates information asymmetry that is not merely inconvenient but constitutive. Boards cannot easily evaluate whether a safety claim is accurate or a growth claim is reckless because the underlying epistemic terrain requires domain expertise that most governance structures do not possess. This is not a gap that better board composition alone can close, though it helps. It is a problem of coordination under verified uncertainty.
This connects to something I find underexplored in the governance literature: the distinction between awareness and capability. Kellogg, Valentine, and Christin (2020) demonstrated this gap in algorithmic contexts, where workers who are aware of how algorithms shape their outcomes still cannot act effectively on that awareness. The same logic applies to boards overseeing AI organizations. A board can be aware that model deployment decisions carry safety implications without possessing the structural schema needed to evaluate specific deployment choices. Awareness of the problem does not confer the adaptive expertise required to govern it.
Jensen Huang and the Adjacent Problem of Structural Dependence
Separately, reporting this week on Jensen Huang's exit from Nvidia has surfaced a related but distinct governance failure: the indispensable leader problem. Nvidia's flat organizational structure, which concentrated strategic and technical judgment in Huang, created what succession analysts are now describing as an institutional single point of failure. This is a different pathology than the one Toner identifies, but it shares a common root. Both cases involve organizations that subordinated governance redundancy to operational velocity. The assumption in both cases was that leadership competence at the top was sufficient to substitute for structural checks. Rahman's (2021) work on invisible cages in platform firms is instructive here: control is not always visible at the level of explicit rules. It can be embedded in architectural choices about who holds information, who interprets outcomes, and who is positioned to intervene when something goes wrong.
The Governance Schema Problem
What Toner is implicitly calling for is not more trust in better people. It is a different governance architecture, one where the structural features of AI development are legible to oversight bodies in a way that does not depend on the goodwill or transparency of the executives being overseen. This is precisely the distinction between folk theories and structural schemas that motivates my own research. A board operating on folk theories of AI risk, meaning individual impressions formed through general news consumption and executive briefings, is not equipped for far transfer when novel governance challenges emerge. What is needed is schema induction at the board level: training that targets structural features of AI development rather than surface-level procedural knowledge about specific products.
Gentner's (1983) structure-mapping theory is useful here. Transfer of expertise depends on the ability to map relational structures from a known domain onto a novel one. Boards with deep governance experience in regulated industries such as finance or pharmaceuticals have relevant structural schemas. The problem is that those schemas were built for environments where the information asymmetry between executive and regulator, while real, was bounded by decades of regulatory infrastructure. AI moves faster than that infrastructure can build itself, which means the schemas that exist are systematically underpowered for the domain they are being asked to govern.
What This Actually Implies
Toner's interview is not primarily a story about Altman or OpenAI. It is a signal that the people who sat closest to the governance failure of 2023 have concluded that the structural conditions producing it have not been resolved. That is worth taking seriously. The AI governance literature tends to focus on regulatory frameworks and technical standards. What Toner is pointing to is something more fundamental: the principal-agent gap in AI leadership is currently not bridgeable by trust alone, and organizations that are designing governance structures around the assumption that it is are building on a premise that the evidence does not support.
References
Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy. Cognitive Science, 7(2), 155-170.
Kellogg, K. C., Valentine, M. A., & Christin, A. (2020). Algorithms at work: The new contested terrain of control. Academy of Management Annals, 14(1), 366-410.
Rahman, K. S. (2021). The invisible cage: Workers' reactivity to opaque algorithmic evaluations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 66(4), 945-988.
Roger Hunt